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Why have the two cities diverged so much? First, cultural similarities notwithstanding, historical legacies of the two towns have been different. Independent Lucknow inherited sectarian strife between Shias and Sunnis but communal peace between Hindus and Muslims. Post-1948 Hyderabad inherited the reverse. (The term "communalism" is used in India for interreligious strife, and "sectarianism" for intrareligious conflict.) Second, Hyderabad politicians have on the whole used communal polarization and violence as a strategic political tool, whereas Lucknow politicians have sought to build bridges in times of communal tension. Third, a large fraction of Hindus and Muslims is locked in an economic symbiosis in Lucknow, whereas no such interlocking interdependence marks Hyderabad's economy. Possible relationships among three variables -historical legacies, political strategies, and economic structure -need to be explored. The notion of networks of civic engagement explains differences observed in the two towns. The violent towns support postmodern arguments about violence, but the peaceful towns do not. "Representations" can easily triumph over "facts" if networks of intercommunal engagement have collapsed. Historically, peaceful towns are endowed with such networks. They prevent the transformation of tensions and trivial incidents into riots and violence.
Two Local Histories, One National History
The Communal Inheritance of Hyderabad India under the British had two broad political arrangements. British India, about two-thirds of the country, was directly administered by the British, whereas princely India, the remaining third, was indirectly governed. The Indian princes had power over the day-to-day governance of their territories, but the British were sovereign.
Communal amity, it is generally argued, marked princely India, partly because electoral pressures did not exist there, as they did in British India. Politicians did not have to mobilize Hindus and Muslims to win power; the prince instead would distribute power through patronage, keeping some kind of balance between the two communities. The Hyderabad Nizams were part of princely India until 1947-48, and Lucknow Nawabs until 1856.
What was the state of Hindu-Muslim relations in Hyderabad under the seventh Nizam, who ruled from 1911 to 1948, the period most relevant for our purpose? Muslims dominated state employment. Though 10 percent of the state's population, they held over 75 percent of jobs.23 State employment was based not on competition but on patronage. The economic system was feudal. The feudal estates covered about 40 percent of the state, 37 percent of its villages, and a third of the state's population. Of the seven biggest feudal estates, each over a hundred villages, six were Muslim, and one Hindu. 24 The industrial sector was dominated by Hindus, but it was much too small to affect the overall power structure. 25 In the 1920s two sets of rival religious organizations emerged in Hyderabad. Their aim was to proselytize. The Arya Samaj (or Samaj) was the main Hindu organization. The Samaj argued that centuries of "alien" rule -first the Mughal, then the British -had weakened Hinduism, and practices such as idol worship had corroded its spirit. To revive itself, according to the Samaj, the community needed to be made conscious of its heritage from the days before idol worship and to reclaim those Hindus who had converted to Islam and Christianity.
Islamic proselytization was conducted primarily by the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Musilimeen (MIM, or Majlis). 26 
Economics as Integration, Economics as Separation
What is the routine life of Hindus and Muslims like in the two cities? What kind of work do they do? Which economic structure works better for communal peace, and why?
Muslims never formed the business communities in Lucknow and Hyderabad. They were primarily in government employment. A significant fraction was also employed by the feudal lords living in the cities. In Hyderabad, the Nizam's armed forces, bureaucracy, and police were disbanded or restructured, forcing a large Muslim migration to Pakistan. From Lucknow, too, there was a substantial migration of middle class professionals after 1947, not because the state bureaucracy was terminated but because it was hard to tell in advance what would happen to Muslims in India. Muslims as a proportion of the two police forces and bureaucracies declined significantly in both towns, though no hard figures can be given. 6 At independence, Muslims in both towns were at opposite ends of the economy. The very rich and the poor stayed in India, the former because they had high property stakes, and the latter because they were too poor to migrate. The middle classes had considerably thinned. The Hindus could be found in all classes. They also dominated local businesses.
How did this economic structure develop after independence? What consequences, if any, did it have for communal relations?
Lucknow's economic developments are relatively straightforward. The embroidered textiles industry, known as Chikan and Zardozi and based on the special skills of Muslim artisans, progressively became the heart of Lucknow's economy. Embroidery is a skill not easily replicable by machines. The use of modem technology is minimal, and there are no factories in the production process. It is a huge putting out system based on piece-wages and is classified in the informal or unorganized sector.6' In 1972 there were approximately 45,000 workers in the industry.62 By the late 1980s they grew to between 75,000 and 100,000. 63 If we assume a family size of six to seven and two workers per family -fair assumptions, given descriptions of the industry -about 200,000 to 300,000 people are partially or wholly dependent on embroidered textiles in Lucknow." Since the town's population was about 1. In an ideal analytical world subsumable in a regression equation, tests of "multicollinearity" can be conducted. The world of communalism and large historical trends, however, do not lend themselves easily to "identifying variables" and regressions. Qualitative logic rather than statistical testing is our basic tool. What turns up if we apply this yardstick?
As in Hyderabad, communal tensions do appear in Lucknow, and nasty rumors spread. However, Lucknow is able to manage them, while in Hyderabad they lead to violence. Indeed, symbolically charged and sacrilegious provocations which have repeatedly precipitated riots in Hyderabad were also tried in Lucknow between 1990 and 1993 by those who wished to create riots. A Hindu holy man (sadhu) was killed, and a rumor circulated that a Muslim had killed him. It turned out that a Hindu had killed the holy man. Pork was thrown into a mosque, presumably by Hindus. It was discovered that a Muslim was responsible. Similarly, color was thrown into a mosque during the Hindu festival of Holi. As is evident from Table 1 , any of these events in Hyderabad would have been contextualized, been woven into the narrative of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, been used as an occasion by politicians to make provocative speeches, and led to retaliatory violence. In Lucknow, the district administration was able to catch the culprit quickly in each case and present him before his own community, the peace committee, and the press. Thus, the same provocations had different outcomes. Why? We need to understand the mechanisms that prevent the transformation of provocations and tensions into riots in one city, but not in another.
Local In the cases where the postmodern argument does not hold, the overpowering of the master narrative by more regionally or locally specific narratives is less troubling for postmodernists. Given their distrust of master narratives, of modernity, nationalism, and communalism, they have often celebrated "local resistance" and its "authenticity." Distinguishing facts from representations is much more damaging. In most of its variants, postmodernism insists on the inseparability of facts and representations.73 Because of prior networks of intercommunal engagement, facts can be established in peaceful towns; self-interested representations do not displace them. In violenceprone towns, ascertaining facts is considerably harder, perhaps impossible. Violence is quickly inserted into narratives, and the politics of representations takes over. Powerful groups seek to turn violence to their advantage, often instigating it as well. Evidence that could establish cause and effect in a linear fashion is wiped out, making it hard for the researcher to establish truth, and oral testimonies are insufficient as a substitute. We are indeed in the postmodern analytic space. In peaceful towns, however, the processes are different. Troublemakers, in an attempt to create riots, may engage in symbolically charged provocations, but local administrations are able to prevent communal violence from breaking out or succeed in controlling it quickly. Before facts dissolve into a battle of representations, they are presented as facts and accepted as such. Postmodern analysis begins to make sense in violent hells. In lands of relative peace, its utility must be considered limited. 
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